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ABSTRACT
Every day, we make a series of tradeoffs between privacy and
convenience. We may check our email, post on social media, use the
free Wi-Fi in public spaces, or take our cellphones with us wherever
we go without a clear understanding of what information we are
giving away when we do so. Increasingly, we are seeing products
that claim to defy this opaqueness associated with big data and put
users at the helm of their information. These “featurized” products
wrap themselves in a data empowerment narrative, but ultimately
erode individual privacy in new ways, sometimes even capitalizing
on it. This article seeks to explore the concept of featurization
further—where it came from, what it is, and how featurized products
are currently being regulated. The article will end by proposing
some recommendations for balancing the innovation that
featurization can bring while ensuring individuals’ privacy rights
are adequately protected.
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INTRODUCTION
“It’s not a bug, it’s a feature.” The pithy catchphrase coined by
programmers to reframe mechanical defects as intentional and
desirable1 also deftly defines the transition from big data’s scary
opacity to a new era of transparency and access. What was once a
bug—the unknowable and seemingly unending troves of data that
1
Nicholas Carr, ‘It’s Not a Bug, It’s a Feature.’ Trite—or Just Right?, WIRED
(Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/its-not-a-bug-its-a-feature/.
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companies have collected about us—is now its feature, by making
users’ data trails visible, accessible, and interactive. This
“featurization” of data has been characterized as the antidote to big
data’s shadowy tendencies—a way to bring companies’ data
collection and use practices into the sunlight, and provide
individuals with tangible value.2 It refers both to the new products
that allow individuals to track and analyze their own data, and the
secondary features provided as a quid pro quo for data collection.
Several companies across many different sectors offer featurized
products. Genetic companies like 23andMe offer individual reports
on ancestry and genetic health risks.3 Financial planning apps like
Mint help users create budgets and remind them to pay their bills on
time.4 Smart thermometers like Nest provide users with information
about their daily movements and routines in addition to helping
them save money on their utility bills.5 Period tracking apps like Flo
and Ovia provide women with insight into their menstrual health
and help them plan and track their pregnancies.6 All of these
applications purport to empower individuals by enabling them to
gain personal knowledge through data collection and achieve
individual goals.
However, while the marketing of these products provides a small
window into companies’ data use practices, they also obscure how
individuals’ data can be used in ways that are adverse to their
interests. Moreover, these behind-the-scenes practices are often
enhanced by the interactive and accessible features these companies
offer. 23andMe, for example, recently sold the exclusive rights to
search through their customer data for drug targets to
2

See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User
Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 242-43
(2013).
3
Compare Our DNA Tests, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/comparedna-tests/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2019).
4
Bill Tracking: Online Monthly Bill Tracking & Reminders, MINT,
https://www.mint.com/how-mint-works/bills#toc (last visited Apr. 26, 2019).
5
Overview,
NEST,
https://nest.com/thermostats/nest-learningthermostat/overview/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
6
See, e.g., Tehrene Firman & Samantha Lefave, The Best Period Tracker
Apps that Belong on Your Phone, REDBOOK (July 31, 2018),
https://www.redbookmag.com/body/g19091742/best-period-tracker-apps/.
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pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline.7 Likewise, periodtracker apps have come under fire for sharing users’ personal
information with advertisers and other third parties.8
The data collected by these products, particularly in sensitive
industries such as finance and health, may harm individuals in
several key respects, including discrimination, economic loss, and
increased vulnerability to data breaches. These practices also create
large databases of extremely personal information that law
enforcement may be able to access without ever having to notify
affected individuals.9 Additionally, by providing direct-to-consumer
services, companies may be able to skirt the more stringent sectoral
privacy laws because they do not fall under the traditional
conception of a covered entity.10
This paper will explore the current era of big data: the countless
products that encourage individuals to engage with data about
themselves and how that interaction leads to harms that manifest
themselves over the long term. Although much has been written
about the privacy and security concerns related to the Internet of
Things, as well as data tracking products in particular industries,
there is currently limited literature on the harms both unique to and
exacerbated by featurization. Part I of this article will provide the
reader with a framework for thinking about featurization and its
benefits. Part II will summarize the state of consumer privacy laws
7

See Megan Molteni, 23andMe’s Pharma Deals Have Been the Plan All
Along, WIRED (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/23andmeglaxosmithkline- pharma-deal//.
8
See Sarah Burke, Your Menstrual App Is Probably Selling Data About Your
Body,
VICE
(May
11,
2018),
https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/8xe4yz/menstrual-app-period-trackerdata-cyber-security.
9
See, e.g., Salvador Hernandez, One of the Biggest At-Home DNA Testing
Companies Is Working with the FBI, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/salvadorhernandez/family-tree-dna-fbiinvestigative-genealogy-privacy; Russell Brandom, Why Facebook is Beating the
FBI
at
Facial
Recognition,
THE
VERGE
(July
7,
2014),
https://www.theverge.com/2014/7/7/5878069/why-facebook-is-beating-the-fbiat-facial-recognition.
10
See, e.g., Katherine Drabiak, Caveat Emptor: How the Intersection of Big
Data and Consumer Genomics Exponentially Increases Informational Privacy
Risks, 27 HEALTH MATRIX 143, 160 (2017).

2019]

FEATURIZATION AND THE MYTH OF DATA EMPOWERMENT

5

in the United States. Part III will assess the harms that featurization
poses and analyze whether existing privacy laws at the federal or
state level offer any meaningful protections. Finally, Part IV of this
article will offer suggestions on how to maintain value and utility
while providing baseline privacy and security protections.
I. FEATURIZATION IN CONTEXT
In 2012, a man stormed into a Minneapolis Target to complain
that the store was mailing coupons for baby and maternity items to
his daughter.11 He found it inappropriate that the store was mailing
her these advertisements while she was still in high school. Target,
however, had just predicted the pregnancy before his daughter had
let the family know. This story became infamous for representing
how companies’ use of big data can quickly cross privacy
boundaries12—and Target is not the only company to have
committed a big data faux pas.13
As more stories emerged highlighting the negative
consequences of big data, public perception of private data
collection shifted.14 By 2014, 91% of adults agreed or strongly
agreed that consumers no longer had control over how companies
used or collected their personal information, while 64% believed the
11

Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before
Her
Father
Did,
FORBES
(Feb.
16,
2012),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-ateen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/#12cc321c6668.
12
See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shoppinghabits.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&hp.
13
See, e.g., Ben Goldacre, When Data Gets Creepy: the Secrets We Don’t
Realise We’re Giving Away, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/05/when-data-gets-creepysecrets-were-giving-away.
14
See, e.g., MARY MADDEN, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND
SECURITY
IN
THE
POST-SNOWDEN
ERA
1-2
(2014),
https://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/; Maggie
McGrath, Target Data Breach Spilled Info on As Many As 70 Million Customers,
FORBES
(Jan.
10,
2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2014/01/10/target-data-breachspilled-info-on-as-many-as-70-million-customers/#104d23c8e795.
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government should do more to regulate advertisers.15 Moreover, the
survey indicated that people wanted more of a say as to how their
data was being used; 93% said that being in control of who may
access information about them was “very important.”16
The concept of featurization was born out of the growing
disenchantment with big data. It was first proposed as a way to
subvert the opacity of companies’ data collection practices, by
making data a “consumer-side feature of products and services.” 17
Simply put, featurization creates an intentional link between
consumers’ data and companies’ data collection and processing
practices by returning some of that value to the consumer. Think of
an ancestry composition report by 23andMe, which distills an
individual’s heritage into neat and distinct categories, or, the Nest
Learning Thermostat, which provides a breakdown of users’
household activity habits; both of these products prominently
display the data they are collecting from users and offer them insight
they may have otherwise been unable to identify. These types of
products and services are now widely available across various
sectors—from medicine to social media.
The problem with featurization, however, is that it merely
provides a window into the data a product collects rather than the
full picture. Under the typical featurization paradigm, users are only
privy to some of the data collected and only some of the ways the
data may actually be used. In this way, access has been falsely
equated with full transparency. For example, although Nest allows
users to see the data collected about them through user activity
reports, Nest had not initially been so forthright about whether its
user data would be combined with Google’s, once it had been

15

Madden, supra note 14, at 30.
Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security
and
Surveillance,
PEW
RES.
CTR.
(May
20,
2015),
https://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacysecurity-and-surveillance/.
17
The term “featurization” was first coined by Omer Tene and Jules
Polonetsky in their seminal piece, Big Data for All. This process, Tene and
Polonetsky suggest, should be offered up as a “quid pro quo for looser data
collection and minimization restrictions.” See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 2,
at 263-64.
16
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acquired.18 Similarly, while 23andMe extols the types of
information it can make available to users about their DNA, it may
bury how long it will keep users’ data, or what it might do with the
data afterwards, even after a user requests its deletion, in the middle
of the privacy policy.19 Featurization thus exacerbates some of the
harms already posed by big data, and, in certain cases, creates new
ones.
This section will break up products that “featurize” data into two
types: those that function through self-surveillance, and those that
provide users access to their data as a secondary benefit, and offer
some examples in each category. Then, it will assess how the
differences might play out under existing laws and regulations.
A. Primary Featurization
Primary featurization is quintessentially about self-surveillance.
The express purpose of primary featurization products is to process
and featurize users’ data; thus, the trade-off between privacy and
insight is made apparent from the beginning of the user’s
relationship with the product.20 More strongly put, these products
are predicated on lessened privacy interests in return for the value
these products purport to offer. Users are subsequently comfortable
allowing themselves to be surveilled to a certain degree in order to
obtain the benefits that the product offers.
The healthcare industry is saturated with primary featurization
products. The abundance of these products can be traced, in part, to
the popularity of the “quantified self” movement, which promotes
tracking health-related data about oneself as a means to further one’s
mental, physical, and emotional health.21 Consequently, the
18

Casey Johnston, What Google Can Really Do with Nest, or Really, Nest’s
Data, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 15, 2014), https://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2014/01/what-google-can-really-do-with-nest-or-really-nests-data/.
19
See, e.g., Peter Pitts, The Privacy Delusions of Genetic Testing, FORBES
(Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/02/15/the-privacydelusions-of-genetic-testing/#898eb721bba5.
20
See Kang et al., Self-Surveillance Privacy, 97 IOWA L. REV. 809, 813-15
(2012).
21
Although the movement began in the 1970s, the term was coined by two
Wired Magazine editors, Gary Wolf and Kevin Kelly, in 2007. The movement
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innumerable products that featurize health-related data include
personal genomics testing; diagnostic apps; and fitness, diet, and
menstrual trackers, that monitor everything from heart rate, calories
burned, number of steps, body temperature, quality and length of
sleep, menstrual cycles, and emotional patterns. To highlight the
types of sensitive personal information these types of products
collect, some examples are described in more detail below. 22
1. Ovulation and Menstrual Trackers
Ovulation and menstrual trackers are part of a growing industry
referred to as “Femtech,” which is meant to use technology to
“improve women’s health.”23 They are typically mobile phone
applications that operate by asking users to provide various
information about their menstrual history and health, and prompt
data collection by telling users that the more information they
provide, the more accurate their results will be. These trackers, such
as Ovia or Flo, not only track when a woman’s period occurs, but
also the emotional and physical symptoms that occur over the course
of their cycle. In order to do so, the apps ask women to input
information about their symptoms and activities. Flo, for example,
asks users to input the nature of their menstrual flow, sex drive and
sexual history, mood, stress level, physical symptoms, and alcohol
consumption, among other things. Users are not just asked to
provide this information during menstruation, but every day.
Although inputting this information is not necessary for the app to

espouses the idea of the “quantified self” as a means to use data to help improve
daily life, e.g., by helping with sleep, diet, and other medical problems. See
Rachael Rettner, The Quantified Self: How Data-Obsessed Trackers Push Toward
Healthier
Lives,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Apr.
8,
2014),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/quantified-self-health-datatracking_n_5111958?ncid=fcbklnkushpmg00000043&ir=Science.
22
For a more extensive list of mobile health apps, and the risks they may
pose, see Healgorithms: Understanding the Potential for Bias in mHealth Apps,
CTR.
FOR
DEMOCRACY
&
TECH.
(Sept.
13,
2018),
https://cdt.org/insight/healgorithms-understanding-the-potential-for-bias-inmhealth-apps/.
23
Kate Clark, It’s a New Era for Fertility Tech, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 28,
2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/28/its-a-new-era-for-fertility-tech/.
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predict users’ cycle dates, the app suggests that logging symptoms
will improve their cycle predictions.

SCREENSHOTS OF FLO24
2. Health Diagnostic Apps
Health diagnostic apps prompt users to provide their symptoms
and then offer medical solutions based on the information provided.
These apps vary significantly from one another in approach and user
experience. WebMD’s symptom checker, for example, simply asks
users for a series of inputs in a standardized format, then displays a
list of conditions that match those symptoms. Other health
diagnostic apps enable users to submit photos along with other

24

Erin Migdol, 9 Apps That Can Help People with Chronic Illnesses Track
Their Periods, THE MIGHTY (Feb. 16, 2018) (image excerpted above),
https://themighty.com/2018/02/period-tracking-apps-endometriosis-chronicillness/.
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inputs about their symptoms.25 Still others use artificial intelligence
(AI) to simulate the experience of speaking with a doctor. The
“health companion” mobile app Ada, for example, asks a series of
questions in a back-and-forth exchange that mimics texting with
another person.26 Once the app identifies a potential condition, it
allows users to save it to their account and helps them connect with
a doctor, pharmacist, or other specialist, if necessary. The Ada app
also enables users to specify whether they are trying to obtain a
diagnosis for themselves or for a friend. Another health app,
Miiskin, helps users keep track of skin spots for early detection of
melanoma.27 Users can upload photos of their skin to the app, which
helps them compare any skin changes over time.28

SCREENSHOT OF MIISKIN APP29
25
What We Do and Who We Are, MIISKIN https://miiskin.com/about/ (last
visited Apr. 23, 2019); Healgorithms: Understanding the Potential for Bias in
mHealth Apps, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://cdt.org/insight/healgorithms-understanding-the-potential-for-bias-inmhealth-apps/.
26
About Us, ADA, https://ada.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2019).
27
About Miiskin, MIISKIN, https://miiskin.com/app/ (last visited Apr. 23,
2019).
28
Id.
29
Explore the Miiskin App, MIISKIN (image excerpted above),
https://miiskin.com/app/ (Apr. 23, 2019).
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3. Genetic Testing Kits
Direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies like 23andMe
have generated a market for at-home DNA testing, promising
consumers a means to discover information about their heritage,
health, and genetic traits. Typically, users send the company a
sample of their DNA and receive a report in a few weeks. These
reports can provide a variety of information, including an ethnicity
breakdown, potential relatives, predispositions towards certain
health conditions, genetic traits, carrier status for various diseases
and genetic disorders, and overall wellness information.

SAMPLE 23ANDME HEALTH REPORT30
4. Finance Industry
Outside of the healthcare industry, there are also many products
that featurize financial data. Most of these apps are designed to assist
with money management, although the types of information they
30

23AndMe Ancestry DNA Test Review: A 10-Minute Deep Dive (2019
Update),
MY FAMILY DNA TEST
(image
excerpted
above),
https://www.myfamilydnatest.com/23andme-review/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2019).
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require, and the sophistication of the services they offer, vary
significantly. For example, the mobile app Trim claims it will be
able to save users money by negotiating down their bills and
analyzing their transactions.31 The Albert app provides investment
and savings advice, helps users develop a budget and financial plan,
and alerts users when their bills and subscriptions increase. Albert
also enables users to engage with it in a text-based format, in order
to reach live financial assistants for advice.

SAMPLE DIALOG WITH ALBERT GENIUS32
Most of these apps require the user to link their bank account,
and some require users to also provide the login information for their
various subscriptions.
31
32

2019).

TRIM, https://www.asktrim.com (last visited Apr. 23, 2019).
ALBERT (image excerpted above), https://albert.com/ (last visited Apr. 26,
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These products are marketed in a way that capitalizes on the
mentality of the “quantified self” movement—that more
information and more revelations make life better. For example,
23andMe’s homepage states, “Commit to a healthier you, inspired
by your genes—with 125+ genetic reports” 33; Fitbit’s homepage
includes the remarks: “Fitbit motivates you to reach your health and
fitness goals by tracking your activity, exercise, sleep, weight and
more”34; Ovia Health, the creator of several fertility and planning
apps, states, “We help women and families navigate their most
important moments with personalized and data-driven solutions for
fertility, pregnancy, and parenting.”35 Finally, Mint’s tagline to
consumers is, “We help you effortlessly manage your finances in
one place.”36 Primary featurization products are thus marketed on
the basis that they provide convenience, insight, and savings to the
consumer—that they essentially exist to make consumers’ lives
easier. However, as Part III will discuss, this obscures the privacy
and security harms these types of products pose to consumers.
B. Secondary Featurization
Secondary featurization differs from primary featurization in
that the product’s functionality is not predicated upon user data
collection, and, therefore, users may choose not to purchase or use
the product on the basis of the value that the data collection process
offers.37 However, as demonstrated with Facebook, users may still
engage with that particular feature of the product or acquiesce to that
type of data collection as a result of the way the process is marketed.

33

See Health + Ancestry, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/?myg=1
(last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
34
See FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/home (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
35
See OVIA HEALTH, https://www.oviahealth.com/ (last visited Apr. 24,
2019).
36
See MINT, https://www.mint.com/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
37
Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 2, at 263-64 (describing quid pro quo
featurization in which consumers are likely to be more willing to share
information if organizations also provide access to that personal data in formats
that can be useful with other third party applications).
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Moreover, many of the privacy concerns remain the same as with
primary featurization.38
Nest’s Learning Thermostat is one such example of secondary
featurization. Nest’s Learning Thermostat primarily functions as a
“smart thermometer,” meaning that it learns users’ energy habits to
help regulate temperature in a way that saves them money, and
offers the added convenience of being able to be set remotely. Nest
also provides users with insight into “their own data trail” by
allowing them to see what information it has gleaned about a user’s
daily routine.39 While this feature does provide users with valuable
information, it is also another way for Nest to collect information
about them in a way that is only very loosely connected to its stated
purpose.40 Perhaps this subterfuge makes users more amenable to
the fact that these “smart thermometers” are actually using motion
sensors to track movements throughout the household. 41
Another, and perhaps the most quintessential example of
secondary featurization, comes from Facebook, the social media
website that has been growing and adapting since it was first
launched in 2004.42 One of Facebook’s first forays into featurization
was the creation of its News Feed, which curates posts generated by
users to be displayed in an algorithmically-determined order.43
Facebook reportedly conceptualized the News Feed as a
“personalized list of stories” based on “the latest headlines
generated by the activity of your friends and social groups,” to
combat the chaos and clutter of its Live Feed and provide users with
a way to easily see the most relevant updates.44 Although the change
38

Infra Part III.
See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 2, at 265.
40
Id.
41
See Privacy Statement for Nest Products and Services, NEST
https://nest.com/legal/privacy-statement-for-nest-products-and-services/
(last
visited Apr. 29, 2019).
42
Sarah Phillips, A Brief History of Facebook, THE GUARDIAN (July 15,
2007), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia.
43
Josh Constine, How Facebook News Feed Works, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 6,
2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/09/06/ultimate-guide-to-the-news-feed/.
44
Samantha Murphy, The Evolution of Facebook News Feed, MASHABLE
(Mar. 12, 2013), https://mashable.com/2013/03/12/facebook-news-feedevolution/#IoSYn_ZKLPq0.
39
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initially incurred protests and privacy concerns, it quickly became
an integral part of Facebook’s interface.45
Nearly ten years later, Facebook revealed its data scientists had
been manipulating the News Feeds of hundreds of thousands of
users in order to conduct a psychological study assessing “how
emotions can be spread on social media.”46 They did this by
randomly selecting users and changing the number of positive or
negative posts they saw.47 Notably, an analyst commented that
“Facebook didn’t do anything illegal, but they didn’t do right by
their customers.”48 Although Facebook ended that experiment with
an apology, they subsequently manipulated News Feeds in another
way: by removing professional news posts.49 That move was also
met with significant criticism, including commentary that Facebook
was “increasing fake news and misinformation on the platform.” 50
Facebook’s News Feed is just one of many features offered to
its users that enabled the company to obtain more information about
individuals, and to propel data usages not initially intended nor
made publicly clear. In 2010, Facebook also rolled out a phototagging feature that suggested the names of individuals in each
photo, purportedly to save time when uploading photos.51 According
to some advocacy groups, the company did not adequately explain
to users, however, that by providing identifying information—the
45

Mercedes Bunz, Facebook Users Protest Over News Feed, THE GUARDIAN
(Oct. 27, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/media/pda/2009/oct/27/newfacebook-newsfeed-protest.
46
Vindu Goel, Facebook Tinkers with Users’ Emotions in News Feed
Experiment,
Stirring
Outcry,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
29,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/technology/facebook-tinkers-with-usersemotions-in-news-feed-experiment-stirring-outcry.html.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Alex Hern, Facebook Moving Non-Promoted Posts Out of News Feed in
Trial,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
23,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/oct/23/facebook-non-promotedposts-news-feed-new-trial-publishers.
50
Julia Carrie Wong, Facebook Ending News Feed Experiment Condemned
as
‘Orwellian’,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
1,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/01/facebook-news-feedexperiment-media-posts.
51
Murphy, supra note 44.
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“tag”—to their photos, users were actually honing the company’s
facial recognition technology.52 Meanwhile, as each new feature
was introduced, all in the name of the consumer, Facebook slowly
began to pull back on the privacy protections it offered. 53

SCREENSHOT OF FACEBOOK PHOTO TAGGING FEATURE54
With featurization, the collection and use of data often begins as
a way to add value for consumers. Yet, there remains no protection
against repurposing that data, even if it happens years later.
Moreover, as discussed in the following part, users often lack

52

Complaint In re Facebook, Inc. and Facial Recognition, (filed Apr. 6,
2018), https://www.epic.org/privacy/facebook/FTC-Facebook-FR-Complaint04062018.pdf.
53
Kurt Opsahl, Facebook’s Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline, ELEC.
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Apr.
28,
2010),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebook-timeline.
54
Ben Parr, Facebook brings facial recognition to photo tagging, CNN (Dec.
16,
2010)
(image
excerpted
above),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/social.media/12/16/facebook.facial.recognitio
n.mashable/index.html.
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adequate remedies if they are unhappy with the privacy concerns
that manifest later.
II. EXISTING PRIVACY AND SECURITY PROTECTIONS
Currently, the United States does not have a comprehensive
federal law governing privacy. Rather, privacy laws and regulations
in the United States are broken up into two main branches. 55 First
are the several sectoral privacy laws that govern more sensitive areas
of information including healthcare, finance credit information, and
information relating to children.56 The second branch comes from
the Federal Trade Commission’s enforcement authority under
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”). 57
Certain other laws, like California’s recently passed California
Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) and the EU’s General Data
Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), also apply to many U.S.
companies.58 Each of these laws is discussed in more detail below.
A. Sectoral U.S. Privacy Laws
Sectoral privacy laws are limited in scope. They only protect
certain types of information, under certain circumstances. The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), for example, protects
financial information, but only applies to “financial institutions” that
engage in activities such as lending or exchanging money, providing
loans, or collecting debts.59 Similarly, The Health Insurance
55

See Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and
Privacy,
COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN
REL.
(Jan.
30,
2018),
https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data-protection.
56
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6502 (West
2019); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 45 C.F.R. § 164.105
(2019); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6801 (West 2019); Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (2019).
57
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
58
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100
(West 2019) (effective Jan. 1, 2020); Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L
119) 1, 5 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR].
59
16 C.F.R. § 313.1 (2019); How to Comply with the Privacy of Consumer
Financial Information Rule of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, FTC (July 2002),
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Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) only applies to
“covered entities,” which include healthcare providers such as
doctors and pharmacists, health plans, health clearinghouses, and
the business associates of these entities.60 Consequently, companies
that provide at-home DNA testing kits would not be regulated by
HIPAA, nor would most mobile medical apps. As a result, even
though these apps may collect information that is equally as
sensitive as the type of information individuals may share with their
doctor, these companies are not subject to heightened regulations
governing how they may use or share that data. 61
B. FTC Enforcement
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is the primary regulator
of U.S. privacy law.62 Although the FTC’s enforcement authority is
broader and could extend to the companies that create and sell
products that featurize data, it is limited in other respects. Rather
than regulate affirmative privacy requirements under Section 5 of
the FTCA, the FTC regulates against “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices” affecting commerce.63 In that sense, rather than propagate
general privacy requirements, the FTC must look at business
practices individually to determine whether they are unfair or
deceptive. While this enables the FTC to respond to new threats to
data privacy and security as they emerge, those concepts are difficult
to define in the context of featurization.
The FTC primarily regulates privacy violations under the
“deceptive” prong of its authority precisely because unfairness is a

https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/how-comply-privacyconsumer-financial-information-rule-gramm#whois.
60
See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014).
61
See, e.g., Drabiak, supra note 10 at 146.
62
See Press Release, FTC, FTC Releases 2018 Privacy and Data Security
Update,
(Mar.
15,
2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2019/03/ftc-releases-2018-privacy-data-security-update.
63
Robert Gellman, Can Consumers Trust the FTC to Protect Their Privacy?,
ACLU (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/internetprivacy/can-consumers-trust-ftc-protect-their-privacy.
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slippery term.64 But, the harms of featurization may not be
considered a “deceptive practice” because this usually requires that
a company violated an explicit promise it made, such as in its
privacy policy.65 In most cases of harm posed by featurization, the
privacy policy enumerates the ways in which individuals’ data
might be used; it may just not be facially apparent. In addition,
companies may write vague policies to avoid FTC scrutiny or
modify their policies as they discover more uses for the data. 66
Because of this, there may be “little the FTC can do.” 67
Moreover, the FTC’s primary way of penalizing a company that
has engaged in an unfair or deceptive practice is to issue a consent
decree.68 This typically requires the offending company to
implement certain privacy and security programs and subjects them
to twenty years of FTC oversight.69 However, for bigger and more
profitable companies, the FTC’s bark may still be worse than its
bite.70 Facebook, for example, has been subject to a consent decree
for nearly ten years, though recent news about the company suggests
that the decree has had little impact.71 The FTC has developed
important privacy requirements over time through its enforcement
authority.72 However, without more affirmative enforcement
authority, the FTC alone will not be able to mitigate these concerns.
64

Joseph Jerome, Can FTC Consent Orders Effectively Police Privacy?,
INT’L. ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF. (Nov. 27, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/can-ftcconsent-orders-police-privacy/ (a “showing of injury [is] not easily met in privacy
disputes”).
65
Gellman, supra note 63.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
See Jerome, supra note 64.
69
Id.
70
Id.; see also Nitasha Tiku, Why Facebook’s 2011 Promises Haven’t
Protected Users, WIRED (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/whyfacebooks-2011-promises-havent-protected-users/.
71
See Jerome, supra note 64, (“But as the FTC’s oversight of Facebook
reaches its midpoint, there is growing evidence that these orders simply create
box-checking exercises without protecting anyone’s privacy.”).
72
See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, FTC’s $5 billion Facebook settlement:
Record-breaking and history-making (July 24, 2019) https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/business-blog/2019/07/ftcs-5-billion-facebook-settlement-recordbreaking-history.
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Increasingly, the FTC is using its “unfairness” authority to
regulate data security measures.73 When addressing unfairness, the
FTC considers three factors: (1) whether the practice, even if not
unlawful, offends public policy; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical,
oppressive, or unscrupulous; and (3) whether it causes substantial
injury to consumers.74 For data security practices, this means the
FTC requires that companies engage in encryption protocols
compatible with industry standards and factor in the risk of security
breaches when making decisions about how to store their users’
data.75 However, this may not be adequate to protect against data
breaches of featurized data—both because this type of data, which
is provided directly by the user, may be extraordinarily sensitive,
and because the FTC’s practice of penalizing companies after the
harm has occurred may not be sufficient to protect against future
breaches by developing standards to protect against future harms as
technology advances.76
C. California Consumer Privacy Act
The CCPA offers new privacy protections for California
residents and imposes additional requirements on larger companies
that collect users’ personal information. 77 In particular, the CCPA’s
purpose limitation requirement and rights of access and deletion all
offer some protections for data collected through featurization.78
However, the CCPA may not be sufficient to protect against all
types of harms caused by featurization.

73

See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2015).
Id.
75
See Patricia Bailin, Study: What FTC Enforcement Actions Teach Us About
the Features of Reasonable Privacy and Data Security Practices, INT’L. ASSOC.
OF
PRIVACY
PROF..
(Sept.
19,
2014),
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/FTC-WhitePaper_V4.pdf.
76
See, e.g., Adam Mazmanian, Senate Bill Would Give FTC New Data
Breach
Authority,
FED.
COMPUTER
WK.
(Jan.
10,
2018),
https://fcw.com/articles/2018/01/10/ftc-data-breach-mazmanian.aspx.
77
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100
(West 2019) (effective Jan. 1, 2020).
78
Id.
74
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The CCPA requires companies to provide individuals with
information regarding the categories of personal information a
company collects, as well as the purposes for which that information
will be used.79 In addition, individuals may request information on
the categories of personal information that is collected and the
company’s purposes for collecting or selling it.80 Such disclosures
could help individuals understand how their data is being used if the
information is provided to them in an easily understandable format.
Nonetheless, this right to request information does not prevent the
types of adverse uses featurization implicates and would only
require disclosure after the fact.
The CCPA also imposes certain purpose limitation
requirements.81 Under the law, businesses may not use collected
information “for additional purposes without providing the
consumer with notice and consent.”82 The CCPA also prohibits
companies from collecting, selling, or using personal information
“except as necessary to perform the business purpose.” 83
Additionally, in the event of a merger under the CCPA, covered
companies must provide users with the right to opt out if the “third
party materially alters how it uses or shares the personal information
of a consumer in a manner that is materially inconsistent with the
promises made at the time of collection.”84 However, these
protections may be inadequate against all the harms caused by
featurization. Unless notice is displayed prominently and consent is
obtained in a way that is meaningful, it is unclear whether this notice
and consent requirement adds anything meaningful to the existing

79

Id.
Privacy Framework Comparisons, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., 3
(Dec. 2018), https://cdt.org/files/2018/12/2018-12-12-CDT-CCPA-GDPR-ChartFINAL.pdf.
81
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100.
82
Id. § 1798.100(b).
83
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(t)(ii).
84
See DATAGUIDANCE, Comparing Privacy Laws: GDPR v. CCPA, FUTURE
OF
PRIVACY
FORUM,
5
(2018),
https://fpf.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/GDPR_CCPA_Comparison-Guide.pdf.
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privacy framework.85 Moreover, companies may choose to only
afford certain rights—like the opt-in mechanism—to California
residents, which they are legally entitled to do under the law. 86 In
addition, the CCPA excludes aggregate and deidentified data, as
well as processing done on data that is “publicly available,” which
may undercut some of the protections it affords. 87
D. General Data Protection Regulation
The GDPR grants certain affirmative privacy rights to
individuals and is similar to the CCPA in several respects. The
GDPR provides data access rights like the CCPA, and it also
imposes strict purpose limitations and data minimization
requirements on data controllers and processors.88 Under the GDPR,
data may only be collected for a specified purpose and cannot be
“further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those
purposes.”89 This purpose specification analysis must be done via
case-by-case analysis to determine whether further processing is
compatible by examining, among other things, the context of the
data collection, the relationship between the purposes for data
collection and the purposes for further processing, the nature of the
data, and the impact further processing may have on the data
subjects.90 Moreover, personal data cannot be stored for longer than
“is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are
processed.”91 In addition, the Article 29 Working Party, a recently
decommissioned European data protection advisory board, clarified
that these purposes must achieve a certain level of specificity, and
that information related to privacy should be delivered in a multi85

See, e.g., SOLON BAROCAS & HELEN NISSENBAUM, ON NOTICE: THE
TROUBLE
WITH
NOTICE
AND
CONSENT
(2009),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2567409.
86
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(g) (“‘Consumer’ means a natural person
who is a California resident, as defined in . . . the California Code of
Regulations[.]”)
87
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145(a)(5).
88
GDPR art. 24-43.
89
GDPR, art. 5.
90
DATAGUIDANCE supra note 84.
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GDPR, art. 5(1)(b).
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layered notice to consumers to ensure they are accessible and easily
readable.92
Although these provisions appear to offer some meaningful
protections, the nature of featurization may still subvert them—
particularly in instances where adverse uses are enumerated in the
Terms of Service from the product’s inception, and the benefits that
the data can provide require that it be stored for a long period of
time. Returning to the genetic-testing kit example, individuals may
want their DNA data to be stored for continued access; or, they may
have granted research rights to these companies, thus enabling the
companies to keep data for several years in order to serve that
purpose. However, throughout that time, the company could still use
that data and engage in practices that are adverse to the individual’s
interest if that type of use was included in the fine print. 93
It is also worth noting that the GDPR has only recently been
enacted and has only been in effect since May 2018. Accordingly, it
may take more time before the contours of these provisions become
clear.
III. CONCERNS UNDER EXISTING LAW
Many of the harms posed by featurized products stem from the
increase in quantity and sensitivity of the information they are able
to elicit from consumers. These products, and the value they purport
to offer, make consumers more willing to input and interact with
their data in ways that are more revealing than ever before. It is this
willingness to increase one’s data trail, for particularly sensitive
information, from which additional harms flow. Existing law is illequipped to address the issues that featurization presents. The
patchwork of laws that govern privacy in the United States
92
Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 29, Data Protection Working Party (Nov.
2017), at 6-8.
93
See, e.g., Erin Brodwin, DNA Testing Company 23andMe has Signed a
$300 Million Deal with a Drug Giant — Here’s How to Delete Your Data if that
Freaks
You
Out,
BUS.
INSIDER
(July
25,
2018),
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/dna-testing-delete-your-data23andme-ancestry-2018-7-1027400770; Piotr Foitzik, How to Apply the GDPR
Data Minimization Principle to Online Sales, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’L.
(Feb.
26,
2019),
https://iapp.org/news/a/how-to-apply-the-gdpr-dataminimization-principle-to-online-sales/.
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predominantly follow a notice and consent model, which may be
insufficient to provide adequate protections in the context of
featurization—particularly where users are inputting data
themselves, rather than passively having data collected about them.
Moreover, most U.S. laws that govern sensitive personal
information, like health or financial information, would not apply to
companies that engage in featurization. Other mechanisms for
enforcement of privacy protections, like the FTC’s Section 5
authority or industry self-regulation, may also fall short. Similarly,
California’s new CCPA and Europe’s GDPR offer more affirmative
privacy protections, but also may not go far enough to protect
against the types of harms that featurization presents.
Featurized products elicit sharing of personal information that is
viewed as intrinsically private. This sharing facilitates new uses for
data that companies otherwise would not have access to. Most
people, for instance, probably would not approve of a company
maintaining a proprietary interest in their DNA and then selling it to
pharmaceutical companies. Nonetheless, that is exactly how athome genetic testing companies like 23andMe operate, and millions
of users provide them with their data every day. 94 The reason, of
course, is likely that they were interested in learning more about
their ancestry or health background and found companies whose
stated purpose was to do exactly that, without considering what
might happen to their data afterwards. 95
In addition to encouraging data sharing, featurized products may
increase an individual’s data trail by combining or selling their data
to third parties. An individual’s data from various accounts can be
combined in the event of a merger, or a single company may collect
data on its users in different ways, and subsequently combine them
to create more holistic profiles of each one.96 Returning to at-home
genetic testing as an example, consumer genetics companies like
23andMe have generated a market for at-home DNA testing,
promising consumers a means to discover information about their

94

Drabiak, supra note 10, at 147 (81.5% of consumers further stated they
would get genomic testing done if they could afford to).
95
See, e.g., Opsahl, supra note 53.
96
See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 18.
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heritage, health, and traits.97 While the marketing suggests these
companies are targeted towards the direct-to-consumer market and
create products solely for the purpose of allowing individuals to
discover more about themselves, the truth is that 23andMe’s
intended market was never just consumers. 98 Rather, genomics
companies have collected a significant amount of information,
which “makes them appealing to a number of additional parties,
including data brokers, the pharmaceutical industry, employers,
health insurers, and law enforcement.”99
In both instances, a user’s data profile is expanded in ways that
were likely unforeseeable to them and could then be used for
purposes that are adverse to their interests, or make them even more
vulnerable in the event of a data breach.100 This increase in an
individual’s data trail, coupled with an absence of clear regulation
addressing featurization, has led to three main harms: (1) increased
vulnerability to data breaches, (2) the expansion in scope of
permissible surveillance by law enforcement, and (3) discrimination
resulting in economic loss. It is worth noting that these harms are
also much more likely to be felt acutely by marginalized
communities, particularly low-income communities and
communities of color.
A. Increased Vulnerability to Data Breaches
An increased data trail combined with additional data sharing
makes individuals vulnerable to data breaches, simply because their
data exists in more places, and in more sensitive and revealing
ways.101 As consumers come to rely on featurized products for
97
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99
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(Sept.
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multiple purposes and across various industries, it likely increases
their “attack surface”—that is, the number of potential avenues for
their sensitive information to be exposed or exploited. 102 This is
particularly true as individuals use these types of products across
several different sectors without assessing the compound effects this
might have on the protection of their data overall.
Moreover, it makes individuals vulnerable to more harmful
types of data breaches. Nest data, for example, would be able to tell
adversaries when an individual is out of the home or on vacation—
information that could be used “for future digital attacks, or simply
for burglary.”103 DNA data is also enticing to potential hackers
because of its uniquely identifying nature. In several recent
instances hackers broke into DNA databases and held sensitive
personal data for ransom.104 Hackers could also sell this information
to data brokers or other interested parties who could then use that
information to discriminate against or target individuals in a variety
of contexts.105 While these concerns are in a far-off and perhaps
uncertain future, they still highlight how certain types of data can be
much more harmful if leaked. As some experts have pointed out,
you can change your credit card number, but you can never change
your DNA.106
While no data is guaranteed to be secure, existing laws are not
yet sufficient to ensure this data is required to be kept as
cryptographically safe as possible. There have been numerous
instances of featurized products containing easily exploitable
102
See Tim Woods, 5 Ways to Reduce Your Attack Surface, SECURITY
MAGAZINE (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/89283ways-to-reduce-your-attack-surface; Lily Hay Newman, Hacker Lexicon: What
Is
an
Attack
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WIRED
(Mar.
12,
2017),
https://www.wired.com/2017/03/hacker-lexicon-attack-surface/.
103
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SECURITY
(Jan.
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2018),
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2018/01/17/hospital-ransomware/;
Angela
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VERGE
(June
6,
2018),
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Chen, supra note 104.
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glitches, or even times when that data was actually hacked.107
Because the companies that create many of these featurized products
are not required to comply with strict regulations, it is up to these
companies themselves to maintain stringent enough standards to
prevent data breaches.108 This has often not worked out.109 It was
recently reported, for example, that a fertility planner app contained
a glitch that would have allowed “someone with no hacking skills at
all” to access highly sensitive information about the women who use
the app.110 While these apps do not necessarily present an above
average risk of data breach compared to others on the market, it is
the sensitivity of the information they collect that makes data
breaches of this kind to be a particularly serious harm. In the case of
fertility apps, these companies collect several strands of sensitive
information, including the user’s history of abortions, moods,
medications, and smoking or drinking habits. 111 But, because
sectoral privacy laws like HIPAA do not apply to these types of
companies, they have no heightened incentive to protect this
information.
B. Expanding the Scope of Permissible Surveillance
Featurization vastly expands the types of information accessible
to law enforcement without a warrant. Traditional privacy
protections granted under the Fourth Amendment do not apply to
information voluntarily shared with third parties.112 Because
107
See, e.g., GRANT HERNANDEZ ET AL. SMART NEST THERMOSTAT: A
SMART SPY IN YOUR HOME (2014), https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us14/materials/us-14-Jin-Smart-Nest-Thermostat-A-Smart-Spy-In-Your-HomeWP.pdf; Zach Whittaker, DNA Testing Startup Veritas Genetics Confirms Data
Breach, TechCrunch (Nov. 7, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/07/veritasgenetics-data-breach/; Jerry Beilinson, Glow Pregnancy App Exposed Women to
Privacy Threats, Consumer Reports Finds, CONSUMER REPORTS (July 28, 2016),
https://www.consumerreports.org/mobile-security-software/glow-pregnancyapp-exposed-women-to-privacy-threats/.
108
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109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Burke, supra note 8; Beilinson, supra note 107.
112
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. United States
complicates the third party doctrine slightly by introducing additional analysis

28

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 15:1

featurized products are predicated on individuals intentionally
providing what is often highly sensitive and personal information, it
could mean they are inadvertently enabling law enforcement to
access this information.
There are considerable risks associated with DNA data. The
popularity of at-home genetic testing has created databases
containing millions of people’s DNA, which law enforcement has
already accessed without a warrant and likely will continue to do.113
Moreover, when individuals submit their DNA to a company, their
family members are at risk of identification too. Through a process
called familial matching, police are able to compare DNA from a
crime scene to DNA in databases to search for partial matches,
which potentially indicates the suspect is a relative of the match. 114
In a recent high-profile case, police were finally able to catch Joseph
James DeAngelo, the Golden State Killer, in 2018 by creating a fake
profile on GEDMatch, a public DNA database and uploading DNA
collected from previous crime scenes to search for a matches.115
They were able to identify DeAngelo after their sample matched the
DNA of DeAngelo’s relatives, who were on the site.116

that may be factored in. However, currently, it is unclear how this will play out in
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J.L. & TECH. 352, 361-66 (2019).
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Crimes (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justiceannounces-interim-policy-emerging-method-generate-leads-unsolved-violent;
Megan Molteni, The Future of Crime-Fighting is Family Tree Forensics, WIRED
(Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/the-future-of-crime-fighting-isfamily-tree-forensics/.
114
See Molteni, supra note 113.
115
See Rachel Becker, Golden State Killer Suspect was Tracked Through
Geneology Website GEDMatch, THE VERGE (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/26/17288532/golden-state-killer-east-arearapist-genealogy-websites-dna-genetic-investigation.
116
Id.

2019]

FEATURIZATION AND THE MYTH OF DATA EMPOWERMENT

29

DNA is not the only type of sensitive information that law
enforcement may now have greater access to. Law enforcement has
already requested data from wearables, like a Fitbit, to assist in
ongoing investigations and could foreseeably demand biometric
data or other sensitive information be shared with them as well. 117
In instances where law enforcement may access an entire database
of information at a time, it could enable systems of mass
surveillance that are ripe for abuse.118 Under existing law, there are
few protections to protect against this kind of expansion in law
enforcement’s power.119
C. Discrimination and Economic Loss
Use of featurized products may also lead to discrimination
against and economic loss for certain individuals. Insurance
companies, employers, and other third parties who may access this
data could use it to perform predictive analytics in ways that
discriminate against certain individuals, or otherwise cause harm.
For example, DNA sequencing may one day be used to predict
individuals’ “susceptibility to adverse health conditions and
development of disease.”120 Insurance companies may increase their
premiums for individuals who are genetically more likely to acquire
a certain disease. Loan companies may deny loans if data predicts
that a potential borrower could get a disease and die before they can
117
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pay their debt back. Credit scoring companies, too, may be
repurposing this type of data in ways that may cause future financial
harms to consumers.121
In addition, while the majority of featurized products in use
currently are obtained in a personal capacity for personal use, the
companies that create these products are increasingly partnering
with employers and insurance companies in order to create
mechanisms for monitoring employees or subscribers. 122 The
pregnancy and menstrual tracker Ovia, for example, recently came
under fire for partnering with employers and sharing data with
employers relating to their employees in an aggregate format.123 In
the case of Ovia, employees must opt in before their data can be
shared with employers, even in aggregate format.124 However, many
are concerned that these companies are targeting individuals who
are in an incredibly vulnerable position, and consumers may not
realize exactly what they are giving away.125 In addition, employers
may entice their employees to provide this information through
monetary incentives or other rewards. Activision Blizzard, for
example, offered its female employees one dollar a day to opt into
the employer version of Ovia.126 As one woman put it, “that’s
money for diapers and bottles.”127 But, without more limitations on
the collection and use of this data, employers may be able to use this
information in largely invisible ways that are harmful to their
employees. Although existing discrimination laws protect against
wrongful terminations on the basis of pregnancy, for example, that
121
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alone may not be sufficient to deter the wrongful conduct of all
potentially implicated employers.
Finally, in the adverse data-sharing context, data may be sold to
data brokers or other for-profit third parties. This can lead to a
number of subsequent issues, including placing people in high-risk
classifications, and marketing to them in predatory ways. 128 These
companies can already tell “if you’ve just gone through a break-up,
if you’re pregnant or trying to lose weight, whether you’re an
extrovert, what medicine you take, where you’ve been, and even
how you swipe and tap on your phone.”129 Combining this
information with featurized product data may allow data brokers to
infer even more about individuals, including highly sensitive
information.
D. Impact on Vulnerable Communities
These harms may be most acutely felt by vulnerable populations,
such as low-income communities. Individuals with fewer resources
may increasingly rely on these products to fill in areas of life that
are otherwise unaffordable.130 Because many featurized products,
like diagnostic medical apps or AI-enhanced financial assistant
apps, offer services that would otherwise be expensive, it is more
likely that these communities would come to rely on them more.
These vulnerable populations may use featurized apps as substitutes
for doctors or other established institutions. Thus, the risks posed
are enhanced for these populations, particularly in these instances. 131
Because federal regulations have yet to catch up to some of these
technologies, the consequences for these individuals could be
severe. For example, featurized applications are not legally required
128
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to be accurate.132 Pregnancy tracker apps have recently come under
fire for being inaccurate,133 and, diagnostic apps, although they may
caveat that they are not a substitute for medical professionals, could
also incorrectly diagnose individuals in ways that deter them from
getting medical treatment or cause them to seek the wrong type of
treatment.134 This is especially true considering that artificial
intelligence enhanced applications are already notorious for their
bias against people of color and women. 135
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Create Statutory Limitations on the Third-Party Doctrine
Federal law needs to evolve to protect featurized data above the
Fourth Amendment baseline. Although the Supreme Court in
Carpenter held that the Fourth Amendment protects private cellphone location data from warrantless searches, as of now, it is
unclear whether that analysis would apply to featurization.136
Crafting a warrant requirement for highly personal and sensitive
information like the DNA or biometric identifiers held in either
public or private databases would help ensure that this information
is not used adversely for law enforcement purposes. Some states
have already enacted laws for these purposes. For example,
California requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant before
gaining access to data from digital voice assistants.137 However,
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merely requiring a warrant for this type of data is not sufficient to
protect users’ personal information. Those on the receiving end must
also challenge overbroad warrants or those that are not sufficiently
particularized.138
B. Increase Oversight into Products in Sensitive Industries
Federal law must adapt to the rise of featurization and provide
greater protections for the information collected by these products,
particularly in sensitive areas like health and finance. This can be
accomplished in several ways, including amending sectoral privacy
laws like HIPAA and the GLBA to cover these types of products, or
crafting new laws specifically targeting featurization. Regardless,
these laws must include provisions to ensure security, accuracy, and
fairness.
1. Security
Under existing law, there is only a patchwork of security
requirements for individuals’ data. HIPAA, for example, includes
an affirmative cybersecurity requirement for personal information
held by covered entities, and, currently, the FTC is in the noticeand-comment phase of amending the GLBA to include more
detailed and stringent security measures regarding financial
information.139 These two laws, however, would likely not apply to
the majority of featurized products in the health and finance spaces.
The FTC’s Section 5 authority governs cybersecurity requirements
for most other players in industry. However, under the FTC’s unfair
and deceptive practice enforcement alone, it is difficult to ensure
that all companies are maintaining sufficient cybersecurity
138
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standards, and, moreover, to identify those who are not, before
individuals’ data is compromised.
A federal law that creates a safe harbor or certification for
companies that voluntarily enact more stringent cybersecurity
requirements, similar to the Cyber Shield Bill that Senator Markey
introduced in 2017, could provide the requisite incentive to ensure
individuals’ data is safer, without being overly-burdensome to small
companies who may find compliance too onerous. 140 If that
certification were displayed prominently, users would be able to
make better-informed choices about each product they use.
2. Fairness
Featurized data in the health and finance sectors must be guarded
from misuse. Accordingly, the law should prohibit this data from
being used in ways that are adverse to the individuals’ interest. For
example, federal law should unilaterally prohibit featurized data—
like DNA data collected through at-home genetic testing kits—from
being sold to insurance companies or employers unless
pseudonymized in a way that prohibits re-identification of specific
consumers. Moreover, in instances where the data would be sold to
third parties without aggregation or pseudonymization, the company
must acquire the individuals’ express consent.
3. Accuracy
Featurized products must also be regulated for accuracy,
particularly when they may act as a substitute for in-person services,
such as financial assistance or diagnostic medical applications.
Moreover, because these types of products may impact vulnerable
populations more severely, any new federal law should be required
to conduct impact assessments on how, in particular, they perform
within regard to vulnerable populations.
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CONCLUSION
Featurization can benefit consumers by promoting greater
awareness of health, finance, and energy habits. However, the data
collected by this process is ripe for abuse—both by law enforcement
and by private companies. The companies that collect this data can
not only gather both a greater amount and more sensitive
information about individuals, but also profit off of this practice in
ways that pose significant privacy risks to users. There must be
stronger privacy protections enacted in order to protect against these
risks while still preserving the benefits that featurization can
provide.

